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1 
Introduction 
The expansionary fiscal policy pursued during the last decade in Colombia has raised important issues 
for the financial system as well as for the conduction of monetary policy. On the one hand, fiscal 
deficits have generated a dramatic issuance of public debt. The financial turmoil experienced at the 
end of the decade increased the appetite for these assets, as financial institutions sought to rebalance 
their portfolio to less risky assets. In addition, since 2002, the Government has been reducing its 
foreign exchange risk exposure by relying more on the domestic capital market. Recently, the central 
bank has increasingly intervened in the foreign exchange market, sterilizing its dollar purchases with 
sales of Government paper. As a result, the financial system has dramatically changed its asset 
composition towards undiversified holdings of domestic public debt. This has implied that market risk 
has become a major concern for institutions used to manage credit risk. In Colombia this issue is 
magnified by the lack of hedging mechanisms and by problems relating to the measures of market risk 
used to calculate capital requirements.  
On the other hand, the increase in public debt can impose constraints on monetary policy that differ 
from traditional effects such as public debt monetization, crowding out and threats to the payments 
system or financial intermediation. Namely, due to the specific problems mentioned above, market risk 
can become a relevant constraint on the response of monetary policy in the outburst of an external 
shock. Facing a shock to the sovereign spread that causes a depreciation of the currency and a fall in 
domestic long bond prices that affects the financial soundness of intermediaries, the central bank may 
be constrained or reluctant to adjust policy to keep inflation on target.  
This note is divided into three sections. The first presents the evolution of public debt and its effect on 
the financial system. The second section discusses why market risk may become a constraint on 
monetary policy and how the central bank could respond to a shock to the capital account in these 
circumstances. The final section concludes.  
1.  Public Debt Market Risk and the Financial System 
(a)  Evolution and effects of public debt 
Public debt has increased rapidly in Colombia since the mid-1990s as a consequence of the 
expansion of public expenditure that resulted from the adoption of a new Constitution in 1991 
(Graph 1). Although several tax reforms have been approved since then, tax revenues have not kept 
up with expenditures and increasing deficits have ensued, especially after proceeds from privatizations 
declined (Graph 2). Central Government gross debt rose from 14% of GDP in 1995 to 54% in 2002 
(Graph 3). Part of this increase, however, is explained by the effect of the sharp real depreciation of 
2002 on the domestic currency value of external debt. Since 2003 the public debt ratio has diminished 
due to both a real appreciation and a reduction of the fiscal deficit (Graph 2). 
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The share of foreign currency denominated debt hovered around 50% of total Central Government 
debt between 1995 and 2002 (Graph 4), while total debt increased (Graph 3). Thus, the foreign 
currency risk exposure of the public sector rose significantly, becoming a source of concern. Since 
2002, the Government has started to rely increasingly on the domestic market (Graph 5). This process 
was made easier by the disruption of the credit markets caused by the financial crisis of 1998-2000. 
The financial weakness of households and corporations reduced credit demand, while the fragility of 
banks’ net worth and the high credit risk perception decreased credit supply. Hence, the Government 
was able to place increasing amounts of public paper (called TES) in the domestic financial sector 
without exerting excessive pressure on the market for loanable funds. The growing size of private 
pension funds’ portfolios has been another source of demand for TES. In this process the Government 
has carried out several swaps of foreign debt for domestic currency debt, in addition to the direct 
placement of TES in the domestic market. 
More recently, an additional supply of TES to the market has come from the sterilization of central 
bank intervention in the foreign exchange market (Table 1). This intervention has been linked to the 
uncertainty about the persistence and strength of the appreciation of the domestic currency. Both the 
rise in domestic public debt and the sterilization of intervention in the foreign exchange market have 
produced a growing exposure of the financial system to non-diversified market risk, since a large 
fraction of its TES holdings are long term, fixed rate bonds that are valued mark-to-market.  
An interesting aspect of this discussion is the rationale behind the willingness of the financial system to 
accept a growing exposure to domestic public debt without diversifying it. Part of the explanation has 
to do with the absence of domestic assets with an inverse correlation. However, financial 
intermediaries may invest abroad to diversify their portfolios, so their incentives to hold a large stock of 
domestic public debt must be explained by other reasons. Capital adequacy ratios (CARs) well above 
the minimum required levels and an international conjuncture characterized by declining sovereign 
spreads and expectations of currency appreciation may be plausible ones. On the other hand, an 
underestimation of market risk measures or moral hazard (the expectation of a bail-out) may be other, 
more worrisome explanations. 
The increase in domestic public debt holdings by financial institutions is probably the mayor change 
Colombian banks have suffered during the last 5 years. As Graph 6 shows, by 1997 securities 
holdings by credit institutions represented around 12% of their assets. By 2005, holdings increased to 
32%. This dramatic change in the balance sheet structure implies that market risk issues have 
increased their importance in a financial system used to manage almost entirely credit risk.  
A simple stress test applied to the Colombian financial system’s holdings of public securities reveals 
that the effects described are important today and may become more relevant in the future, if 
exposure to public debt growth is not curtailed. Tables 2 and 3 show that a 100 bps. parallel increase 
in the TES spot curve could cause losses close to 17% of the profits obtained by credit institutions, 
which are historically high, and 2.5% of the value of their portfolios as of May 2005. To provide an idea 
of the potential for such losses to occur, it suffices to recall the electoral uncertainty in Brazil in 2002 
which led Colombian sovereign spreads to rise by 490 bps with a corresponding increase in domestic 
long interest rates of 430 bps. . It subsequently took six months for the spread to return to its previous 
levels.  
The problem is not restricted to credit institutions. Pension funds’ exposure to market risk is also 
significant (Table 3), although it might be argued that a large part of their TES portfolios is to be held to 
maturity. However, the option given to savers to change their pension fund every six months increases 
liquidity and market risk for the funds.  
(b)  Some Additional Problems Specific to Colombia 
Adequate bank capital or the existence of risk sharing mechanisms may alleviate market risk. In this 
regard, however, there are some deficiencies in Colombia that are a matter of concern, especially 
given the size of the exposure of the financial system to market risk. 
(i)  Insufficient aggregate risk sharing: 
The financial system as a whole holds an uncovered long position in TES. Again, this is the 
counterpart of a reduced foreign exchange exposure of the public sector. Both risks may be lessened 
by transferring them to another agent, which in this case would be non-residents. The participation of 
foreign investors in the local TES markets is small and has been restricted by a tax on interest BIS Papers No 28  191
 
remittances, the need to register and set up a “country fund” and a minimum holding period regulation 
aimed at discouraging short term volatile inflows. In addition, to some extent, domestic and external 
bonds are imperfect substitutes due to currency risk, among other things.  
On the other hand, some aggregate hedging has been provided by recent issues of peso-
denominated external debt bonds (called Global TES) by the Ministry of Finance, although the 
amounts are still small relative to the size of the foreign currency denominated debt stock or the TES 
holdings of the financial system (the Global TES stock represents 1.6% of total Central Government 
debt). In addition, the hedge provided by this instrument is limited by the fact that part of these bonds 
could end up in the hands of local financial intermediaries, in particular if there is an effort to do so to 
improve the liquidity of the bonds and make them more attractive for potential non-resident buyers. 
Nevertheless, this mechanism should be exploited as long as there is interest on the part of foreign 
investors
2. 
(ii)  Insufficient individual risk sharing: 
A well developed system to share market risk among financial intermediaries does not exist in 
Colombia. Among other things, the following factors explain this deficiency. 
•  Lack of legal protection for the holders of guarantees, which inhibits the development of 
liquid Repo and security lending markets. It also constrains the administration of margin calls 
by the exchanges. 
•  Incomplete regulation of security lending markets (it is not clear what may or may not be 
done) and inadequate regulation of Repo markets3. 
•  Lack of a benchmark to develop short and long run forward rate agreements. 
The result is the possibility that an under-capitalized and over-exposed institution may fail after a 
shock to the prices of TES. Depending on the size of the institution, the authorities might then face a 
“too big to fail” problem that could have been avoided through an adequate distribution of market risk 
among banks. 
Since the reasons behind this problem are mainly related to legal or regulatory gaps, there is plenty of 
room for improvement. A Securities Law approved in June 2005 addressed some of these issues, but 
more remains to be done. The scope for market risk sharing is large. As long as CARs vary among 
banks, more capitalized agents could offer hedging alternatives to those exposed to a larger extent to 
fluctuations in market rates. In particular, those agents with substantial long positions in TES but with a 
CAR close to the regulatory level of 9% could benefit from the hedging offered by highly capitalized 
and less exposed agents. Graph 7 shows that there is room for such a risk sharing scheme to develop 
in Colombia. Firstly, there seems to be a negative correlation between exposure to market risk (in TES 
only) and CAR
4. Secondly, intermediaries with a similar portfolio (in size) have different exposures and 
adequacy ratios. This suggests that there are suitable counterparts in the hedging market.  
(iii)  Problems with the measures of market risk: 
The measures of market risk in Colombia are based on a VaR approach that suffers from some 
shortcomings that imply an underestimation of the related capital requirements. Current regulation 
allows financial agents to reduce capital requirements by matching active positions belonging to the 
trading book with liabilities from the banking book, thus underestimating the marginal cost of an 
additional unit of public debt exposure. To illustrate this, Table 4 shows the estimated capital 
requirements for the financial system that would result from the application of the standard model 
recommended by the Basel Committee
5. The interest rate module is disaggregated in all instruments 
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(TES) which are subject to such a risk. The exchange rate and stock exchange modules refer to 
the financial system’s exposure to foreign currency
6 and market stocks
7, respectively. This 
exercise illustrates that the current capital requirement (COP$ 880 billion) is about 50% below the 
requirement implied by the standard model (COP$ 1,271 billion). This happens even though this 
methodology takes into account only the risk associated to the trading book and the information 
available is not sufficient for the measurement of market risk for all positions (e.g. private sector 
securities and options are excluded from the exercise). 
A correction of this underestimation does not imply an immediate need to raise banks’ capital, 
since the current CAR for the system is around 14, higher than the minimum requirement (9). 
However, if the exposure keeps growing with the financing needs of the Government, this 
constraint may become binding, especially after 2007, when the introduction of a new system to 
compute credit risk related provisions could imply lower observed CARs
8. In this sense, a revision 
of the current methodology to measure market risk is important and, with time, would imply a 
downward correction of the TES prices, since the marginal cost of capital required to buy TES 
would be higher. 
Another issue regarding the measurement of market risk has to do with the fact that TES markets 
are relatively less liquid in stress periods than bond markets in developed countries, so the time 
period used to estimate the volatilities needed to compute potential losses is probably longer in 
Colombia than in other countries. Indeed, the main concern for monetary policy is not the losses 
stemming from a day to day fall in TES prices, but rather a rapid and persistent climb in interest 
rates such as the one recorded in 2002-2003 after sovereign spreads skyrocketed (Graph 8). 
2.  Public Debt Market Risk as a Constraint on Monetary Policy.  
The fact that exposure to market risk is high and that conditions for alleviating such risk are 
limited may pose a constraint on monetary policy. The importance of these conditions for 
monetary policy depends on the possible effect that a shock to the capital account (e.g. higher 
sovereign spreads) may have on the health of the financial system and the risk that this may pose 
for low and stable inflation. Such a shock could simultaneously cause a depreciation of the 
currency and a decline in the value of the TES. If the depreciation is pronounced or the 
pass-through effects are large, the central bank may have to increase its interest rates to keep 
inflation on target. Higher interest rates may in turn result in further reductions in the price of TES. 
If banks’ capital is too low to absorb those losses, financial stability considerations could constrain 
the ability or willingness of the central bank to raise interest rates, thereby inducing higher 
inflation risks.  
Hence, the perils of a large public debt are reflected in trading off foreign exchange risk for market 
or inflation risks, and vice versa. Heavier reliance on domestic public financing and international 
reserve accumulation may reduce the economy’s and the public sector’s foreign exchange risk, 
but will probably imply larger market risks. If mechanisms for alleviating suck risk are limited and 
the central bank tries to avoid the realization of market risks, it must assume an inflation risk: 
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Under the conditions described above, it is worth thinking about an adequate response of monetary 
policy to a sudden, sharp increase in sovereign spreads. How to deal with the risks implied by the 
financial losses associated with the resulting fall in the prices of TES? To answer this question, the 
behavior of the economy after the shock must first be characterized. 
A rise in the spread will result in a depreciation of the currency and a decline in the TES price. 
Although exchange pass-through is low in Colombia, if the depreciation is large, the inflation target 
may be at risk
9. Aside from the cost push effects, the depreciation may increase aggregate demand, 
since the foreign exchange exposure of the private sector has diminished in previous years (Graph 9). 
Inflation expectations may also go up if the inflation target is not fully credible, which might be the case 
after a large depreciation. 
Hence, the central bank will probably have to raise interest rates to minimize the deviation of inflation 
from its target. The size of such a rise will depend on the magnitude of the pass-through effects. It will 
also be affected by the behavior of long term rates and its connection with aggregate demand. The 
increase in long term spreads will cause long domestic rates to go up. If aggregate demand responds 
not only to short rates, but also to long rates, the required rise in the former will be smaller, since part 
of the inflation-control job would be done by the long term rates themselves. This effect would work 
through the impact of long rates on investment or private sector wealth. 
If both market risk exposure and the shock to the spread are sizeable, the foregoing analysis will have 
to be qualified, since the threat of bankruptcy of some financial institutions may force the central bank 
to be less aggressive in fighting inflation. However, it may still have some degree of freedom to limit 
this possibility: 
•  The increase in interest rates could be accompanied by intervention in the foreign exchange 
market. If (sterilized) intervention is effective, this could curtail the size of the depreciation 
and the interest rate hike. In addition, the monetary contraction resulting from the sale of 
international reserves could be compensated by purchases of domestic public bonds, 
thereby moderating the fall in their price. However, this option is limited because the central 
bank will probably have to raise interest rates, the demand for money will fall and the sale of 
reserves cannot be fully compensated by purchases of TES. 
•  If the shock to the price of TES is too large and the effect on banks’ balance sheets is 
severe, the authorities may allow them to temporarily stop pricing part of their portfolios 
mark-to-market when the following conditions are met: 
–  The shock is perceived as temporary and exogenous (not linked to domestic fiscal 
conditions). 
–  Public debt is deemed sustainable; that is, it is perceived that the Government will be 
able to honor its debt. 
                                                       
9  For example, according to the core simulation and forecasting model used by Banco de la República, a 1% exogenous 
increase in the nominal exchange rate causes a maximum increase in annual inflation of 0.064% four quarters later. It must 
be noted that this simulation assumes an active policy by the central bank to drive inflation back into line with the target. The 
experience of 2002-2003 also reveals a low degree of pass-through. Between May 2002 and February 2003 there was a 
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–  Some (possibly large) financial losses are allowed. Otherwise, moral hazard problems 
may be exacerbated leading to future over-exposure to public securities. 
3. Concluding  Remarks 
The increase in public debt issuance has brought important consequences for the Colombian financial 
system. The balance sheet structure, specially that of credit institutions, has changed dramatically with 
an increasing importance of public securities. As result, market risk exposure has become an issue for 
a financial system used to manage credit risk. This rebalancing has created potential threats for the 
stability of the financial system not only due to the size of the exposure, but also because of the 
existence of institutional features that restrict risk mitigation. Particularly, lack of sufficient risk sharing 
mechanisms as well as a proper measurement of capital requirements make market risk a financial 
stability issue. As a consequence, monetary policy conduction might be constrained when facing 
external shocks thus implying an inflation risk.  
Public debt market risk needs to be reduced in Colombia. The latter calls for an effort to reduce not 
only public debt but to remove structural impediments for market risk shedding as well as addressing 
regulatory issues.  BIS Papers No 28  195
 
Graph 1: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE WITHOUT 
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Graph 4: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT DEBT COMPOSITION
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Graph 5:  CENTRAL GOVERNMENT:  INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL 
NET FINANCING
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Size of bubbles = market risk (TES)
Minimum CAR (9%)
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Graph 9:  NET INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT POSITION-COLOMBIA 
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Profits - last 12
months (April 2005)
% of profits that 
would be lost given a 
100 bps. increase in 
TES B rates 
Total Credit Institutions –502,265 2,941,908 17.07% 
Commercial Banks  –473,361 2,471,470 19.15% 
Commercial Finance and Leasing Corporations –1,233 167,367 0.74% 
Cooperative Banks  –99 17,973 0.55% 
Finance Banks  –27,573 285,097 9.67% 
Source: Banco de la República 
The exercise was performed using data up to May 2005.
Net expansion in the market (billions of COP$)          4,501.05          6,691.13 
Net purchases of International Reserves from the market
Millions of US$ Dollars  2,904.9    3,730.9       
Billions of COP$  7,628.8    8,691.0       
Sales of TES in the market 
Billions of COP$  3,127.8    1,999.9       
Net expansion with the Government  –1,460.28    –6,458.8       
Sales of International Reserves to the National Government (NG)
Millions of US$ Dollars  500.0    2,950.0       
Billions of COP$  1,313.1    6,872.0       
Purchases of TES associated to sales of International Reserves to NG
Billions of COP$  1,246.2    5,230.3       
Deposits of the NG in the central bank  1,393.4    4,817.1       
Source: Banco de la República 
Total operations





Resistance of credit institutions’ profits 
Given a 100 bps. increase in TES B interest rates 
Table 1 
Sterilization of the monetary effects 


















TES Fixed Rate 831.2                     
TES UVR 135.2                     
TES TRM 1.4                         
Globals 22.0                       
TES CPI 64.4                       
INTEREST RATE 
MODULE
1,054.3                  
EXCHANGE RATE 
MODULE 54.7                       
STOCK EXCHANGE 
MODULE 162.5                     
TOTAL 1,271.5                  
COP$ Billions 
Market Risk Capital Requirements
 
Source: Banco de la República 
Fixed Rate CPI UVR  Total
Total Credit Institutions  2.11% 3.32% 3.42%  2.50%
Commercial Banks 2.10% 3.34% 3.41%  2.50%
Commercial Finance and Leasing Corporations 1.92% 2.94% 4.31% 2.22%
Cooperative Banks 1.58% 0.00% 0.00% 1.58%
Finance Banks  2.19% 2.95% 3.57%  2.57%
Total Non-Bank Financial Sector  2.60% 3.51% 3.68%  2.96%
Stock Brokers  2.20% 3.54% 3.32% 2.63%
Insurance Corporations 2.42% 3.55% 4.20%  3.02%
Pension Funds  2.72% 3.88% 3.88%  3.09%





As a percentage of the TES B portfolio 
The exercise was performed using data up to May 2005. 
1  For each parallel shift of 100 basis points. 
Source: Banco de la República 